Introduction
Airpower is considered a key, determining factor that shapes the end-results of conventional warfare. Unlike bombing attacks which may not inflict as great damage as necessary on one’s opponents, having superior airpower capabilities are essential to emerging victorious in battle (Dayan, 1999). Yet, as defense forces shift their attention to focus on small wars, the application of classic airpower theories are put to test. This can be seen in the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2008 Gaza War where the enforcement of airpower by the highly-regarded Israel Air Force (IAF) against the guerrilla tactics of the Hezbollah terrorist group was criticized for causing heavy collateral damage (Peng & Lim, 2011). This essay will discuss the role of airpower in winning wars of a smaller-scale, citing the 2006 Lebanon War and the 2008 Gaza War as references. It will also show whether or not airpower is sufficient or even necessary in determining who emerges victorious in irregular wars where ‘hearts and minds’ also matter.
Perspectives on Airpower and Its Applications
Airpower theories created an opening for new perspectives on conventional warfare. Theorists like Douhet articulated the potential brought about by gaining command of the air when in battle. He even went as far as to bring people to envision how it can be possible to bring defeat on an enemy by simply targeting aerial attacks at its civilian populations, inciting its own citizens to protest against their government and demand its surrender. Mitchell furthered this notion by pointing out how it is important to do away with the capacity of one’s opponents to continue with the war, attacking important infrastructure that are critical to the survival of its people (O’Neill, 2011). More than the destruction, the inconveniences that war could cause on people appear to be a significant factor in airpower theory.
One country that has heavily invested on and utilized airpower is Israel. Built around the understanding that war is completely undesirable, the IAF is the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) way of making sure that all threats to security are resolved quickly and decisively. Their strategy is to achieve air supremacy—excellence in the quality of their people, technology, and operations—and air superiority—stronger control and influence in the outcomes of war (Dayan, 1999). For over 50 years, since the War of Independence, the IAF has guarded the air space of Israel. With the acquisition of an immense variety of aerial assets and the expertise of its human resources, the IAF has played a key role in keeping Israel’s opponents at bay (Anonymous, 1999).
True to airpower theories, commanding a strong air fleet presents a great threat to civilian welfare. Thus, when IAF fought the 2006 Lebanon War, international press reports were filled with details of attacks made on common areas such as hospitals, schools, places of worship, and community centers. Humanitarian organizations accused Israel of gross negligence as investigations concluded that there was no sufficient evidence that Hezbollah was actually present in targeted areas (Arkin 2007). Wielding such immense power, it can be observed how the use of airpower in smaller operations, often for counter-insurgency, could be more a force of destruction than a force of victory. At some point, criticisms label such bias for aerial dominance as a misapplication of doctrine that resulted from the ‘aerial arrogance’ of airmen (Parton, 2007)….. (CUT OFF)